Imogen Dickie

Position:  
Associate Professor
Email Address:  
Phone Number:  
416-978-5308
Fax Number:  
416-978-8703
Biography:  

B.A. Hons. (Canterbury, New Zealand) B. Phil (Oxford) D. Phil (Oxford)

Research Interests:  
reference, acquaintance, perception
Publications:  

Prof. Dickie’s published and forthcoming work is up on her academia page.

 

— “Informative Identities in the *Begriffsschrift* and ‘On Sense and Reference'”, The Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38(2). 2008.

  • This is about what motivates Frege’s move from the ‘metalinguistic’ account of informative identities to the account in terms of difference in sense.

 

— “The Generality of Particular Thought”. Forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly.

  • This is about the claim that, necessarily, a subject who can think that a is F must also have the capacities to think that a is G, a is H, a is I, and so on (for some reasonable range of ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘I’,…), and that b is F, c is F, d is F, and so on (for some reasonable range of ‘b’, ‘c’, ‘d’,…). §1 sets out, and raises objections to, two arguments for a strong version of this claim (Gareth Evans’s ‘Generality Constraint’). §§2-3 present a new argument for a weaker version of the claim. §4 sketches some directions of inquiry that this new argument opens up.

 

— “Negation, Anti-Realism, and the Denial Defence”. Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.

  • This discusses a recent defence against the intuitionist attack on classical negation, and the significance of this defence for the wider debate about anti-realism and classical logic.

 

— “We Are Acquainted with Ordinary Things”. Forthcoming in Robin Jeshion, New Essays on Singular Thought, Oxford University Press.

  • This paper uses recent empirical results about the object-directedness of perceptual attention to build an account of acquaintance-based thought about ordinary material objects.
Address:  
Department of Philosophy, 170 St. George St., Room 525